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1. Introduction 
Numerous studies have documented that announcements of changes in dividends convey 
specific information to the market (Pettit, 1972; Charest, 1978; Aharony and Swary, 1980; 
among others). The majority of these studies are conducted using U.S. data. One natural question 
is whether these dividend effects are peculiar to the U.S. or if they are also prominent in 
countries where the tax regime and/or institutional and economic characteristics are significantly 
different. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate stock price reactions to announcements of cash 
dividends by companies listed in the Muscat Securities Market (MSM) to identify whether or not 
such dividends contain information relevant to price formation
1
.  
Several important economic and institutional features make Oman a unique and 
interesting environment in which to examine the market reaction to cash dividend 
announcements. 
First, Oman has a unique tax system that allows us to examine the tax-based signaling 
hypothesis related to Black’s (1976) dividend puzzle. He raises the question of why companies 
pay dividends, despite the fact that dividends are taxed at higher rates than capital gains. Tax-
based signaling models provide an answer to this question. The higher tax on dividends relative 
                                                 
1
 Firms listed in the MSM distribute dividends in two forms, cash dividends and stock dividends, though we 
consider only cash dividends in the empirical tests in this paper. The normal practice for these firms is to announce 
earnings ahead of dividends. Dividend distributions in one form or another are not compulsory. If a company’s 
board of directors proposes to distribute dividends, the details must be published in the daily newspapers. The 
proposed dividend is subject to the final approval at the shareholders’ Annual General Meeting (AGM). Generally, 
most dividend propositions are accepted at the AGM because the board of directors usually represents the majority 
of the share capital. Firms usually distribute dividends only once a year. 
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to capital gains makes dividends informative about the company’s future prospects and cash flow 
(Bhattcharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985). These models argue that dividends would not be 
informative if not for the higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains (Amihud and Murgia, 
1997). In Oman, there are no taxes on dividends and capital gains
2
. This situation provides us 
with a unique opportunity to test the tax-based dividend signaling model. Under arrangements 
such as Oman’s, existing models predict that dividends will not be informative, or at least will 
have less information. If we find that stock prices react to cash dividend announcements, then 
this suggests that the higher taxation on dividends relative to capital gains is not a necessary 
condition for dividends to convey information. This finding would also suggest that there are 
other factors beyond taxation differentials that make dividends informative. 
Second, Omani companies rely heavily on bank financing (Al-Yahyaee, 2006). If bank 
monitoring is effective, then dividend payments may not be necessary to reduce the tendency of 
managers to overinvest free cash flow. This should reduce the announcement effects of dividends 
on stock prices. Moreover, Omani companies are owned by a small number of investors who 
have controlling interests (Al-Yahyaee, 2006)
3
. This concentrated ownership structure should 
reduce the agency cost between managers and shareholders. If the concentration of ownership 
leads to less information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, dividend 
                                                 
2
 As Oman is a petroleum-producing country, taxes play a minor role in generating income for the economy (Al-
Yahyaee et al., 2008). As a result, shareholders are not subject to any taxes on dividends. Likewise, there are no 
taxes on capital gains. The only taxes are the 12% flat tax rate on corporate income. This makes the tax system in 
Oman one of the simplest in the world. 
 
3 
During the sample period for this study (January 1997 to December 2005) the average ownership of MSM-listed 
firms by shareholders who own at least ten percent of the issued capital is 52 percent.  See Al-Yahyaee (2006) for 
more details, or contact the corresponding author. 
 4 
announcements should have smaller pricing effects compared to countries where companies are 
owned by diverse groups of investors. Both arguments, together with the absence of taxes on 
dividends and capital gains, suggest that dividends act as neither information-signals nor 
disciplinary mechanisms, and overall, these attributes suggest a diminished role for dividends in 
Oman. 
Third, transparency in Oman is low, while corporate disclosure requirements are loose 
(Islam, 2003). There is a scarcity of professional financial analysts, and management forecasts 
are not provided. Furthermore, Oman lacks credible media to disseminate financial information, 
which in most developed countries is provided by a specialized part of the press and the 
electronic media. Investors have few other sources of information on Omani companies, and this 
makes cash dividend announcements an important source of information in pricing Omani 
shares. The above analysis implies that dividends can be used to evaluate management 
expectations and confidence as to the future performance and prospects of the firm. 
Furthermore, a feature of Omani MSM-listed firms is their variability in cash dividend 
payments. The majority of Omani firms change their dividends almost every year (see Table 1 
below). This practice contrasts with patterns observed in the U.S. and other developed countries, 
where most stocks experience relatively few changes in their dividends. In fact, Aharony and 
Swary (1980) find that about 87% of sampled firms had no change in quarterly dividend 
payments in the U.S during the period January 1963 to December 1976. In the data sampled by 
Bajaj and Vijh (1990), more than 80% of announcements made between July 1962 and June 
1987 involve no change in dividends. When a dividend increase is made, the evidence suggests 
that managers are reluctant to return to previous levels of dividends because announcements of 
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dividend decreases result in significant share price declines. Variability in cash dividends has 
been shown to diminish the information content of dividends (Chen et al., 2002). 
Whether or not investors use cash dividend announcements to price shares in Oman is an 
empirical question. While studies in developed markets show that cash dividend announcements 
have information content, the picture is less clear in Oman. On the one hand, the absence of 
taxes, high bank leverage, and share ownership concentration, the lack of professional analysts, 
and individual investors’ relatively limited knowledge of accounting and finance all suggest that 
dividend announcements may have little impact on share prices. On the other hand, investors 
have few other sources of information on companies and so, in a relative sense, dividend 
announcements may still be the most important piece of information with which investors value 
stocks. We investigate whether the net effect of these factors is positive or negative.. 
Just as in the U.S., our evidence shows that the market reacts strongly to announcements 
of changes in cash dividends. This finding shows that such announcements are used by investors 
as information signals. Firms that increase their dividends experience an increase in stock prices, 
while those that decrease their dividends see an opposite effect. Firms that have no change in 
their dividends experience insignificant negative average abnormal returns, a pattern that is 
consistent with the view that no change in dividends is, on average, a disappointment. These 
findings support the view that dividends convey unique and valuable information to investors. 
Furthermore, these results stand in sharp contrast to tax-based signaling models that argue that 
tax differences are a necessary condition for dividends to convey information about a firm’s 
future prospects and cash flows. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the pertinent 
theories and empirical literature for this study. Section 3 describes both the data sources used in 
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this paper and the specifics of our data sample. Section 4 describes the methodology employed in 
the paper, and section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Theoretical and empirical studies 
In the U.S. it is well established that the market reacts to dividend announcements, which 
implies that dividends contain information (Charest, 1978; Aharony and Swary, 1980). Capital 
markets react favorably to “good news” announcements (dividend increases) and adversely to 
“bad news” announcements (dividend decreases). The implication is that dividend increases 
represent positive information about the company’s prospects. Conversely, a dividend decrease 
is a negative signal about the company’s future prospects. The most frequently cited explanation 
for this pattern is that dividends contain information: the signaling hypothesis. This hypothesis 
states that the firm uses dividends as signaling devices to convey valuable information to the 
market. 
2.1. Signaling and taxes 
Bhattacharya (1979) develops a theoretical model of dividend signaling in which 
dividends are seen as a costly means of removing information asymmetries in the market 
concerning a firm’s true value. Signaling costs are a function of (1) the differential tax treatment 
of dividends versus capital gains and (2) the financing costs of raising unexpected funds to fulfill 
dividend obligations. In Bhattacharya’s model, taxes are an important factor in determining 
dividend announcements’ signaling effects. Dividends are informative due to the higher tax rates 
on dividends relative to capital gains. As agents for shareholders, managers are expected to 
optimize the after-tax objective function of the shareholders. Bhattacharya (1979) argues that 
when there are personal taxes on dividends, the level of the tax is positively related to the 
strength of the dividend signal. A higher tax rate should provide managers of firms with a 
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stronger incentive to tell the truth about the firm’s expected cash flows. Hence, a taxable 
dividend is a good and credible signal, as it is costly for firms with poor performance to imitate. 
Additional theoretical developments are provided by John and Williams (1985). Their 
model is similar to Bhattacharya’s with respect to the cost of signaling, as both models point to a 
tax penalty on dividends relative to capital gains as the primary cost of signaling. In both models, 
dividends are informative because of the higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains. 
The absence of taxes on dividends and capital gains in Oman provides us with a golden 
opportunity to examine the predictions of Bhattacharya (1979) and John and Williams (1985). 
Under this scenario, tax-based signaling models predict that dividends are not informative or are, 
at least, less informative. If we find that the stock price reacts to cash dividend announcements, 
then this would suggest that higher taxation on dividends relative to capital gains is not a 
necessary condition for dividends to be informative. 
2.2. Signaling and agency costs 
Due to the separation between ownership and control, managers (agents) may not always 
act in the best interests of the firm owners. This problem induces shareholders to incur agency 
costs to monitor managers’ behavior. Dividend payments may help in aligning the interests of 
managers and shareholders by cutting down the cash available for use at the discretion of 
management and, hence, providing protection against self-interested actions by the management 
(Easterbrook, 1984). Moreover, paying larger dividends reduces discretionary internal cash flow 
and forces the firm to seek external financing from capital markets, which places it under the 
scrutiny and disciplining effects of investment professionals (Easterbrook, 1984). In other words, 
capital markets provide an efficient monitoring mechanism that helps firms to reduce both excess 
perquisite consumption and the agency problem. 
 8 
Jensen (1986) suggests that managers, motivated by compensation and human capital 
considerations, have incentives to overinvest free cash flows even in the absence of profitable 
growth opportunities (the free cash flow hypothesis). In this case, dividend payout policy 
becomes a vehicle for monitoring managers’ potential to misuse excess funds. Hence, the 
observed market reaction following dividend changes is consistent with a reduction in agency 
costs. 
A clear implication of the standard free cash flow hypothesis as advanced by Jensen 
(1986) is the separation of ownership and control, since wider ownership dispersion intensifies 
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Such conflicts of interest generally 
motivate higher dividend payouts to limit managers’ ability to misuse shareholder funds. In 
Oman, for the most part, firms are closely held, with ownership concentrated in the hands of 
family members in the form of large equity blocks.
4
 This phenomenon suggests that in Oman, 
firms have a disincentive to misuse funds through overinvesting because the relative benefit of 
managing a larger firm is likely to be outweighed by the direct cost to managers of overinvesting 
in their substantial personal holdings in the firm. Furthermore, firms in Oman are highly levered, 
and when banks play a pivotal role in financing firms, agency problems should be less severe (Al 
Yahyaee, 2006). Jensen (1986) argues that debt could serve as a substitute for dividends in 
                                                 
4
 For recent survey papers that investigate ownership concentration as a corporate governance mechanism, see: 
Claessens et al. (2002), which shows that firm value increases with the ownership of the largest shareholder; 
Holderness (2003), who shows that block holders closely monitor the form and level of managerial compensation; 
and Denis and McConnell (2003), who show that ownership tends to be more concentrated in nations where there is 
a relatively lower level of investor protection. The Claessens et al. (2002) paper surveys evidence from eight East 
Asian economies, Holderness (2003) includes all nations, while Denis and McConnell (2003) examine all nations 
except the U.S. 
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reducing the agency problem. Oman’s high leverage, together with its patterns of concentrated 
ownership, leads the existing tax-based signaling literature to expect a weaker information 
content for dividend announcements. 
2.3. Dividend as signal 
There are numerous studies that examine stock price reactions to dividend 
announcements. These studies generally report that stock prices follow the same direction as the 
dividend change announcements. Dividend increases and dividend initiations (or, alternatively, 
decreases and omissions) are associated with significant increases (or decreases) in stock prices. 
An early, extensive empirical study that tests the information content of dividend 
announcements is Watts (1973). His analysis suggests that dividends convey little, if any, 
information about stock valuations once current earnings are controlled for in the experiment. In 
contrast, Pettit (1972) demonstrates that stock prices react significantly to dividend 
announcements. Charest (1978) examines a larger number of firms announcing dividends over a 
long period and finds that abnormal returns are observed beyond the next quarter.  
The two most frequently cited studies in this area are Aharony and Swary (1980) and 
Asquith and Mullins (1983). Both papers use a naïve dividend forecasting model. Aharony and 
Swary (1980) investigate the effects of dividend announcements made on dates different from 
the earnings announcements. Similar to Pettit (1972), they document that cash dividend 
announcements provide information beyond what is included in corresponding quarterly earnings 
announcements. Asquith and Mullins (1983) show significant positive abnormal returns at 
dividend initiation announcements. Significant abnormal returns around dividend 
announcements are also reported by Bajaj and Vijh (1995). 
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Using data from China, Chen et al. (2002) examine the information content of dividends 
among firms that change their dividends frequently. They find that cash dividends have no 
discernible association with stock returns in these cases. Their analysis suggests that the 
variability of dividends diminishes their information content. The fact that dividends vary 
frequently in Oman may also weaken their role as a signals. 
There are also studies that examine the information signaling hypothesis of seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs) and stock splits. In this vein, Elliott et al. (2008) examine the 
information content of SEOs and find no support for the information signaling hypothesis. Chern 
et al. (2008) study the information content of stock splits and find that prices of optional stocks 
embody more information, diminishing the information content of stock split announcements. 
Likewise, Hwang et al. (2008) examine dividend signaling in stock splits. They find that the 
information contained in stock splits is not rapidly impounded in stock prices. 
3. Data  
Our sample consists of the universe of Omani companies announcing cash dividends 
between January 1, 1997 and August 31, 2005. Announcement dates of cash dividends, stock 
dividends, splits, and earnings are obtained from the Muscat Depository and Registration 
Company Database and the MSM website. We also extract earnings data from the “Share-
Holding Guide of MSM Listed Companies.” Stock price data and the MSM index are obtained 
from the MSM database. 
We exclude observations that accompany other corporate events, such as stock dividends, 
splits, or subscription rights. Moreover, we eliminate observations if rights or stock dividend 
announcements were made during the event study period. After this screening process, the final 
sample consists of 501 cash dividend announcements. As shown in Table 1, approximately 50 
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percent of firms increased cash dividends (n = 251), 36 percent decreased dividends (n = 178), 
and 14 percent had no change in dividends (n = 72).  
Insert Table 1 
We examine the trends in dividend payout policy by utilizing aggregate data by calendar 
year on total cash dividends, aggregate earnings, and total market value of equity. Table 2 shows 
that firms distribute a large proportion of their earnings as dividends. On average, Omani firms 
distribute around 77% of their earnings as dividends. The figures presented in Table 2 also show 
that Omani firms distributed around 3.57% of their market value as dividends in 1997. This ratio 
increased to 17.24% in 2003 and then declined to 5.02% in 2005. 
Insert Table 2 
We also obtain data on the announced dividend per share in rials, DIVit, and the stock 
price ten days before the announcement day, Pit. We use these data to calculate dividend yield 
DIVit/Pit, the change in dividend, ∆DIVit = (DIVit – DIVi,t-1), and the change in earnings per 
share, ∆EPSit = (EPSit – EPSi,t-1), for both dividend increases and decreases.
5
 The figures 
presented in Table 3 show that the average dividend yield for the dividend increase sample is 
8.20%. The change in dividends is around 8.39% and the change in earnings per share is 8.47% 
for the same sample. For the dividend decrease sample, the average dividend yield is 6.15%, the 
change in dividends is -4.75%, and the change in earnings per share is -5.68%. 
Insert Table 3 
                                                 
5
 This is similar to the approach in Amihud and Murgia (1997). 
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4. Methodology 
The methodology used in this study follows standard event study methodology (e.g., 
Binder, 1998). Using the market model, we calculate the following statistics: daily abnormal 
return, daily average abnormal return, and cumulative average abnormal return.
6
 
In addition, as a robustness check and to test the sensitivity of our results to beta 
estimation, we follow Charest (1978) and calculate market adjusted abnormal return by 
subtracting the MSM daily return from the observed stock’s return over a given period t.  
 The t-statistic used in this paper is detailed in Boehmer et al. (1991). This test is used in 
many studies, including Graham et al. (2003), Kadapakkam and Martinez (2008), and Adams 
and Mansi (2009). 
 
5. Empirical results 
In this study, we test the null hypothesis that the daily mean abnormal return is zero. In 
other words, cash dividend announcements have no systematic impact on corresponding stock 
prices. We test this hypothesis by performing a parametric t-test, where t-statistics are calculated 
using the cross-sectional standard deviation.
7
 
                                                 
6
 We estimate the parameters for the market models from a regression of daily stock returns on daily market returns 
from 250 to 41 days before the announcement date (t = -250 to t = -41, where t = 0 is the announcement date). 
7
 To check the robustness of the conclusions based on our parametric tests, we also employ a nonparametric sign 
test. Our results are insensitive to this new method. In particular, the z-statistic on the announcement day is 7.5745 
for dividend increase and -8.6410 for dividend decrease. For no change sample, the z-statistic is -1.4142 which is 
insignificant at any conventional level of significance.  
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5.1. Dividend increase 
Table 4 provides daily mean abnormal returns and t-statistics (testing that the mean 
abnormal returns are equal to zero) for the five days before and after the dividend announcement 
date (Day 0), using both the market model and the market adjusted return. 
Insert Table 4 
The positive dividend declaration dates are preceded by positive returns for the five days 
before the announcement. Interestingly, the abnormal return earned on day -1 by dividend 
increasing companies is 1.3%, with a t-statistic of 3.97. The presence of significant positive 
abnormal returns on day -1 shows a somewhat earlier market reaction to the cash dividend 
announcement, which may suggest that there is some information leakage into the market. A 
further 5.78% abnormal return occurs on the announcement date. The results show that the 
market’s major reaction takes place on day 0. This average abnormal return is the largest of the 
abnormal returns in the event period studied. These mean abnormal returns are highly 
significant, especially on the announcement date. The results are consistent with an information 
effect in dividend increase announcements, and thus, they imply that relevant information is 
transmitted to the market when increases in dividends are announced. These results are in line 
with those found in the U.S. and strongly contradict the tax-signaling model, which argues that a 
higher tax on dividends is a necessary condition for dividends to be informative. 
Similar results emerge using market adjusted returns. There is a significant positive 
market reaction to dividend increases. The average abnormal return on the announcement date is 
5.88%, which is very close to the one reported using the market model. These results suggest that 
the estimation error and/or instability of the betas are unlikely to be a driver of our results. 
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5.2. Dividend decrease 
Table 5 gives the results for the dividend decrease sample. These results show that 
abnormal returns are significantly negative when  a dividend decrease is announced. The largest 
t-statistic occurs on the day of the dividend announcement. 
Insert Table 5 
The results again support the hypothesis that dividend decreases impart negative 
information about the firm’s prospects. However, the mean abnormal returns for dividend 
decrease announcements are of much smaller magnitude than those of the corresponding 
dividend increase announcements.
8
 These results are at odds with many previous findings, which 
show that dividend decreases generate price responses that are larger in absolute magnitude than 
those of dividend increases (Pettit, 1972; Charest, 1978; Aharony and Swary, 1980; among 
others). For instance, the daily stock price results of these studies report that mean abnormal 
negative returns on announcement day range from -3% to -10% for unfavorable dividend 
announcements, while mean abnormal returns for favorable news are around 1%. Just as with 
dividend increases, the results obtained here are at odds with tax-signaling models, which argue 
that taxes are a necessary condition for dividends to have information. The results using market-
adjusted returns are almost identical to those reported using the market model.  
5.3. No change 
Table 6 reports the results for companies that did not change their dividends. If no news 
is being signaled to the stock market, then one might logically assume that no abnormal stock 
price movements would be expected. Our results are in line with this proposition. 
                                                 
8
 It is worth noting that the size effects for dividend decreases are smaller than those for dividend increases.  See 
Table 3. 
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Insert Table 6 
The results show that investors who hold these companies’ stocks earned only normal 
returns over the five days preceding and following the cash dividend announcement dates. Mean 
abnormal returns drift randomly over the event period with no significant changes on day 0. 
Mean daily abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero. However, the negative 
signs on the dividend announcement dates are in contrast with those reported in the U.S. For 
example, the mean abnormal returns to announcements of no change in dividends in the U.S. 
were significantly positive in Bajaj and Vijh (1990). 
In brief, our results reveal that cash dividend announcements do carry new information to 
the market. The market reacts favorably to “good news” announcements (dividend increases) and 
adversely to “bad news” announcements (dividend decreases), which supports the view that 
dividend changes convey information in Oman. These results sharply contrast with tax-based 
signaling models, which argue that higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains are a 
necessary condition for dividends to be informative. 
5.4. Cumulative abnormal returns 
We also calculate cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) for different intervals. 
The null hypothesis to be tested is that the cumulative average abnormal returns will be equal to 
zero. The test statistic is the ratio of the cumulative average abnormal return to its estimated 
standard error. The results are presented in Table 7. 
The two day window (-1, 0) shows a significant positive wealth effect surrounding a cash 
dividend increase. When the event window is widened to include additional trading days (-2, +2) 
before and after the announcement, the cumulative abnormal returns are also positive and 
statistically significant. For the (-4, +4) and (-5, +5) windows, the cumulative abnormal returns 
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are positive but insignificant. The CARs for the pre-announcement window (-5, -1) are positive 
but insignificant. For the post-announcement window (+1, +5), the cumulative abnormal returns 
are negative and insignificant. The results are very similar whether we use the market model or 
market adjusted returns. 
For dividend decreases, the (-1, 0) window reveals a significant negative reaction to the 
“bad news” announcements. The CARs are insignificant in the other event windows. These 
conclusions using CARs from the market adjusted return model are consistent with those from 
the market model. 
Insert Table 7 
When there is no change in dividends, the results reveal that the cumulative abnormal 
returns are insignificant in all event windows examined, under both the market model and market 
adjusted returns model. This finding suggests that announcements of no change in dividends do 
not result in significant changes in stock price. 
5.5. Regression results on changes in dividends and earnings  
To examine whether dividends contain information beyond that contained in earnings, we 
follow the approach in Amihud and Murgia (1997). Specifically, we estimate a model where 
announcement abnormal returns are a function of both dividend changes and earnings changes 
relative to stock price. The results are presented in Table 8. 
Our results show that both the ∆DIV/P and ∆EPS/P are statistically significant, which 
suggests that both dividends and earnings news contain information. This discovery, in turn, 
suggests that dividends and earnings are strongly associated with abnormal returns. The adjusted 
R
2
 of the model is 10.78%, and the F-statistic is significant at the one percent level. There are no 
important differences between the response coefficients of dividend increases and decreases. As 
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in Amihud and Murgia (1997), changes in dividends result in significant positive stock price 
reactions beyond what might be expected for the information conveyed just by changes in 
earnings. It should also be noted that the dependent variable in this regression is the abnormal 
return on the dividend announcement date. We do not measure the earnings announcement 
return.  
Insert Table 8 
We also estimate the stock price reaction to changes in dividends and changes in earnings 
(Table 9). We find similar results to those reported above. This finding suggests that dividends 
contain information beyond that contained in earnings. 
Insert Table 9 
6. Conclusion 
While there are many studies that examine dividend signaling in the U.S., this paper is 
one of the few investigations of this topic in emerging markets; it is the first of its kind using 
Omani data. In addition, the data set employed in this paper is unique in that (1) there are no 
taxes on dividends and capital gains in Oman, which allows us to test a tax-based signaling 
model argument that higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains are a necessary condition 
for dividends to be informative, (2) the high concentration of share ownership should reduce 
information asymmetry between managers and investors, which suggests a diminished role for 
dividends, (3) there is low corporate transparency, which implies a positive effect for dividends, 
and (4) most companies change their dividends almost every year. 
Our results indicate that cash dividend announcements do convey information to the 
market. That is, firms announcing an increase in their dividends experience a significant positive 
price reaction, and firms announcing dividend decreases experience a significant decline in stock 
 18 
prices. Firms that have no change in their dividends report insignificantly negative average 
abnormal returns. 
Our findings support the notion that dividend increases convey positive information, 
which results in a positive price reaction; dividend decreases similarly result in negative price 
reactions. This study confirms earlier studies’ findings that there is a significant abnormal return 
during the announcement period. Our analysis is consistent with theories stating that the 
announcement effect is due to dividend announcements’ signaling of valuable information. 
These results are in contrast with tax-based signaling models, which propose that higher taxes on 
dividends relative to capital gains are a necessary condition for dividend announcements to be 
informative. In a market like Oman, with highly concentrated shareholdings and limited 
disclosure of information, dividends may be the one source of information that allows investors 
to evaluate management’s expectations and confidence as to the future performance of a firm. 
Although Oman’s stock market is young and investors there have limited knowledge and 
experience, the stock market appears to efficiently incorporate dividends information in share 
prices and returns. Further development of accounting standards, increased auditing skills, and 
advances in investor education will likely make dividends even more important in the future. 
Though it is beyond the scope of the current paper, it is possible that the reactions to cash 
dividend announcements observed in this paper might be due to behavioral characteristics of 
irrational investors (see, for example, Malkiel (2003) and Shiller (2003)). Future research to 
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Frequency of firm-year observations 
Year Dividend Decrease No Change Dividend Increase Total 
1997 17 7 21 45 
1998 12 3 31 46 
1999 21 8 27 56 
2000 14 13 26 53 
2001 26 2 24 52 
2002 31 9 17 57 
2003 31 8 31 70 
2004 21 16 34 71 
2005 5 6 40 51 
Total 178 72 251 501 
The table reports the number of firm-year observations for each year of the sample for dividend decrease, no change, 
and dividend increase.   
 
Table 2  
Cash dividend distributions 
Year ∑i DIV ∑i EARN ∑i MV 
∑i DIV/∑i EARN 
(%) 
∑i DIV/∑i MV 
(%) 
1997 60.511 137.294 1,692.623 44.07 3.57 
1998 38.027 76.020 824.484 50.02 4.61 
1999 50.702 75.648 835.341 67.02 6.07 
2000 59.249 137.365 747.740 43.13 7.92 
2001 45.382 54.218 610.507 83.70 7.43 
2002 81.488 124.951 937.844 65.22 8.69 
2003 210.298 140.304 1,220.041 149.89 17.24 
2004 237.674 169.240 1,728.093 140.44 13.75 
2005 98.501 198.490 1,961.265 49.63 5.02 
The table presents the annual information on cash dividend distributions to stockholders for a sample of Omani 
firms. The sample consists of all firm-year observations that have data in the Share-Holding Guide of MSM Listed 
Companies over the period 1997 to 2005 that have available information on the following variables: DIV, EARN 
and MV. DIV is the total amount of dividends declared on the common stock. EARN is the earnings after taxes. MV 
is the market value of common stock. The sample contains 512 firm-year observations. ∑i represents the aggregation 
of data by calendar year. The aggregate numbers are expressed in million of Rials.      
 
Table 3  
Descriptive statistics 
Category DIV/P (%) ∆DIV (%) ∆EPS (%) Observations 
Dividends Increase 8.2033 8.3896 8.4714 234 
Dividends Decrease 6.1505 -4.7525 -5.6784 145 
The table reports DIV/P, ∆DIV, and ∆EPS for dividend increases and decreases. DIV/P is the dividend yield, where 
DIV is the announced dividend per share and P is the stock price ten days before the announcement day. ∆DIV is 




Table 4  
The stock market reaction to dividend increase in the Muscat Securities Market 
Event AR(Market Model) T-statistics AR(Market Adjusted Return) T-statistics 
-5 0.5306 0.2863 0.5699 0.2541 
-4 0.4765 0.2233 0.4331 0.1629 
-3 0.1355 0.7301 0.0824 0.4230 
-2 0.2935 0.2109 0.2515 0.1699 
-1 1.3026 3.9654 1.3774 3.9865 
0 5.7826 6.0339 5.8807 6.1021 
1 0.3720 1.1594 0.4323 1.3323 
2 0.1447 0.5275 0.1155 0.4065 
3 0.0970 0.4039 -0.0363 -0.1489 
4 -0.6311 -0.7421 -0.6149 -0.7247 
5 -0.2750 -1.5972 -0.3780 -1.2118 
The sample consists of 251 cash dividend increase announcements in the period January 1, 1997 to August 31, 2005 
for firms listed at the Muscat Securities Market. The Abnormal Return is defined as (1) the difference between the 
actual return on day i and the expected return predicted from the market model and (2) the market adjusted return. T-
statistics are for the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return is equal to zero.  
 
Table 5 
The stock market reaction to dividend decrease in the Muscat Securities Market 
Event AR(Market Model) T-statistics AR(Market Adjusted Return) T-statistics 
-5 0.0863 0.0886 0.1669 0.1698 
-4 0.5818 0.5841 0.5015 0.5010 
-3 0.8056 0.7919 0.6266 0.6108 
-2 0.1858 0.1898 0.9992 1.0156 
-1 -1.0206 -1.0683 -0.8038 -0.8365 
0 -2.4904 -4.1037 -2.4161 -4.0225 
1 -0.3666 -0.3368 -0.5830 -0.5343 
2 0.9777 1.0376 0.9077 0.9564 
3 0.6026 0.6440 0.4017 0.2872 
4 -0.2302 -0.1889 -0.1317 -0.1072 
5 0.5173 0.5018 0.1869 0.1813 
The sample consists of 178 cash dividend decrease announcements in the period January 1, 1997 to August 31, 2005 
for firms listed at the Muscat Securities Market. The Abnormal Return is defined as (1) the difference between the 
actual return on day i and the expected return predicted from the market model and (2) the market adjusted return. T-













The stock market reaction to no change in dividends in the Muscat Securities Market 
Event AR(Market Model) T-statistics AR(Market Adjusted Return) T-statistics 
-5 0.2458 0.6709 0.3567 0.9154 
-4 0.8876 0.2943 0.9310 0.2772 
-3 0.2756 0.7683 0.3952 0.8315 
-2 0.2155 1.2451 -0.0696 -0.1928 
-1 0.0202 0.1087 0.0542 0.2392 
0 -0.9432 -1.4502 -0.7776 -1.1845 
1 -0.8499 -1.6158 -0.2105 -0.3920 
2 -0.4746 -1.1826 -0.5840 -1.3880 
3 -0.3810 -1.1323 -0.4165 -1.1953 
4 -0.7067 -0.5126 -0.6455 -0.4623 
5 0.3728 1.3931 0.3471 1.1180 
The sample consists of 72 no change cash dividend announcements in the period January 1, 1997 to August 31, 2005 
for firms listed at the Muscat Securities Market. The Abnormal Return is defined as (1) the difference between the 
actual return on day i and the expected return predicted from the market model and (2) the market adjusted return. T-
statistics are for the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return is equal to zero.  
 
Table 7 
Cumulative abnormal returns for dividend increase, dividend decrease, and no change in 
dividends. 
 















(+5,-5) 0.0823 0.0811 -0.0035 -0.0014 -0.0134 -0.0061 
 (0.9450) (0.8292) (-0.0326) (-0.0128) (-0.1747) (-0.0722) 
(-4,+4) 0.0797 0.0792 -0.0095 -0.0050 -0.0196 -0.0131 
 (1.1931) (1.0787) (-0.1092) (-0.0539) (-0.2785) (-0.1694) 
(-3,+3) 0.0813 0.0810 -0.0131 -0.0087 -0.0214 -0.0160 
 (2.1973) (2.1120) (-0.2002) (-0.1238) (-0.8123) (-0.5328) 
(-2,+2) 0.0790 0.0806 -0.0271 -0.0190 -0.0203 -0.0158 
 (2.4121) (2.3709) (-0.5936) (-0.4134) (-1.0495) (-0.7244) 
(-1,+1) 0.0746 0.0769 -0.0388 -0.0380 -0.0177 -0.0092 
 (4.6385) (4.7073) (-1.4629) (-1.4336) (-1.3019) (-0.6620) 
(-1,0) 0.0709 0.0726 -0.0351 -0.0322 -0.0092 -0.0072 
 (5.5059) (5.5438) (-2.2475) (-2.0619) (-1.1043) (-0.8192) 
(-5,-1) 0.0274 0.0271 0.0064 0.0149 0.0164 0.0167 
  (0.4648) (0.3921) (0.1298) (0.3008) (0.4012) (0.3466) 
(+1,+5) -0.0029 -0.0048 0.0150 0.0078 -0.0204 -0.0150 
  (-0.1574) (-0.2535) (0.2877) (0.1372) (-0.7009) (-0.5018) 
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for dividend increase, dividend decrease, and no 
change using the market model and the market adjusted return. T-statistics are for the null hypothesis that the 





Regression results of abnormal returns on dividend changes and earnings changes relative to 
stock price 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic 
Constant  0.1685*** 3.9278 
∆DIV/P 4.2789*** 5.0909 
∆EPS/P 0.5793*** 3.1918 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1078  
F-value 26.2028   
Observations 418  
The table reports the results of estimating the announcement abnormal returns (based on the market model) on both 
the changes in dividends and changes in earnings relative to the stock price ten days before the announcement day. 
The table shows the variable, their coefficients, and their t-statistics. T-statistics are heteroscedastic consistent 
(White, 1980).   
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 9  
Regression results of abnormal returns on dividend changes and earnings changes 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic 
Constant  0.1640*** 3.7421 
∆DIV 2.4916*** 5.4156 
∆EPS 0.1846** 2.5484 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0940  
F-value 22.6311   
Observations 418  
The table reports the results of estimating the announcement abnormal returns (based on the market model) on both 
the changes in dividends and earnings. The table shows the variable, their coefficients, and their t-statistics. T-
statistics are heteroscedastic consistent (White, 1980).   
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
